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Notes
BURKE v. RIVO: TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL APPROACH
TO WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental principle of tort law that a victim of negligence
should be compensated for his or her injury and placed as nearly as pos-
sible in the position he or she would have occupied were it not for the
defendant's negligence.' Where the cause of action is for wrongful
pregnancy, however, the majority of United States courts are reluctant
to adhere to this common law principle.2 The courts are reluctant be-
cause this area of the law is emotionally charged, infusing moral, ethical
and philosophical judgments into traditional law concepts.3 Conse-
quently, courts confronted with an action for wrongful pregnancy often
attempt to balance these value judgments against established legal prin-
ciples. 4 In response to the conflict between values and legal principles,
courts have adopted a number of approaches to assess the damages
available in a wrongful pregnancy action. 5
1. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS].
2. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982) (damages
in wrongful pregnancy action limited to actual expenses and injury arising from
unexpected pregnancy and birth; child rearing costs not recoverable); Wilber v.
Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982) (same);Johnson v. Univer-
sity Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 58-59, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (1989) (same).
3. See Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 59, 540 N.E.2d
1370, 1379 (1989) (injecting immeasurable value of child's life into damages
question charges issue with misdirected emotion).
4. See, e.g., Szekeres v. Robinson, 102 Nev. 93, 96-97, 715 P.2d 1076, 1078
(1986) (birth of normal, healthy child is not a "wrong" but a "right"; since no
injury, court will not provide remedy in form of action for damages); Nanke v.
Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 1984) (parent cannot be said to be injured
by birth of normal healthy child: "That a child can be considered an injury of-
fends fundamental values attached to human life." (quoting Cockrum v. Baum-
gartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 198, 447 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1983))); Public Health Trust
v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("[I]t is a matter of
universally shared emotion and sentiment that the intangible but all-important,
incalculable but invaluable 'benefits' of parenthood far outweigh any of the mere
monetary burdens involved.").
5. See, e.g., Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 61, 450 N.W.2d 243,
244 (1990) (parents may recover full damages, including all child rearing ex-
penses and costs connected with birth and pregnancy); Szekeres v. Robinson,
102 Nev. 93, 95, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077 (1986) (no cause of action in tort for birth
of normal child); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn.
1977) (recoverable damages include costs connected with pregnancy and birth
(805)
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In Burke v. Rivo, 6 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ad-
dressed the issue of whether the plaintiff parents were entitled to re-
cover as damages the cost of raising their normal, healthy child, who was
born as a result of the defendant physician's negligent performance of a
sterilization. 7 The Massachusetts court held that child rearing costs are
recoverable damages in wrongful birth actions.8 The court decided that
no public policy considerations precluded recovery of traditional tort
and contract damages in a case of this nature.9 The Burke court, how-
ever, limited the recovery of the costs of raising a normal, healthy child
to cases where the parents' reason for seeking sterilization was founded
on economic or financial considerations. 10 The court further limited the
availability of such damages by holding that in these cases, "the trier of
fact should offset against the cost of rearing the child the benefit, if any,
the parents receive and will receive from having their child."I
This Note will examine the different approaches state courts have
taken when determining the damages recoverable for the birth of an un-
planned, but healthy, child.12 This Note will analyze the Burke majority's
reliance upon moral and ethical values in formulating a public policy
rationale for its refusal to recognize traditional tort principles of dam-
ages. 13 Finally, this Note will consider where Burke fits into the various
and "reasonable costs of rearing the unplanned child [offset] by the value of the
child's aid, comfort and society during the parents' life expectancy"); Coleman
v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761-62 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aft'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975) (parents may recover limited damages associated with pregnancy and
birth, but may not recover child rearing costs).
6. 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
7. Id. at 769, 551 N.E.2d at 4. The Burke court articulated the issue before it
as
whether the plaintiffs are entitled, if they establish liability, to the cost
of raising their child. Under normal tort and contract principles, that
cost is both a reasonably foreseeable and a natural and probable conse-
quence of the wrongs that the plaintiffs allege. The question is whether
there is any public policy consideration to which we should give effect
to limit traditional tort and contract damages.
Id.
8. Id. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6.
9. Id. at 769, 551 N.E.2d at 4. For a discussion of the Burke court's analysis
of the public policy considerations involved in the case, see infra notes 77-86 and
accompanying text.
10. Burke, 406 Mass. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6.
11. Id.
12. State courts take four different approaches to the availability of dam-
ages in wrongful pregnancy actions: (1) failure to recognize a cause of action;
(2) application of a "limited damages rule"; (3) application of a "benefit rule";
and (4) allowance of full recovery. For a discussion of the "no cause of action"
approach, see infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
"limited damages rule", see infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the "benefit rule," see infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the full recovery rule, see infra notes 55-62 and accompany-
ing text.
13. See Burke, 406 Mass, at 769-70, 551 N.E.2d at 4. For a discussion of the
2
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approaches taken by state courts and whether the case is part of a trend
toward a more rational approach to damage awards in wrongful preg-
nancy actions. 14
II. BACKGROUND
The cause of action in Burke was based upon an allegation that the
defendant physician negligently performed a sterilization procedure
upon the plaintiff mother that resulted in the birth of a normal, healthy
child. 15 In order to better understand the Massachusetts supreme
court's holding in Burke, as well as the reasoning behind its holding, it is
necessary to briefly explain the relevant terminology in this area of tort
law. 16 The terms "wrongful birth," "wrongful life," "wrongful preg-
nancy" and "wrongful conception" tend to be used loosely by courts
and commentators. 17 Each of these terms, however, has a separate and
distinct meaning.
A "wrongful birth" action is an action brought by parents to re-
cover damages associated with the birth of a child who has a mental or
physical defect.' 8 A wrongful birth action is based upon an allegation
that the defendant physician was negligent in one of two respects:
(1) failing to perform a medical procedure to detect possible defects in
the fetus; or (2) failing to inform the parents of the likelihood of their
conceiving a baby who would be born with birth defects (in other words,
negligent genetic counseling). 19 Courts usually recognize this type of
majority's reliance upon ethical values, see infra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
14. For a discussion of the Burke court's approach to wrongful pregnancy
actions and trends in this area, see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
15. Burke, 406 Mass. at 765-66, 551 N.E.2d at 2.
16. The Burke court did not utilize the terminology which will be defined in
this Background section and used throughout this Note. The use of precise ter-
minology is important, however, in order to analyze the Burke court's position
within this complex area of the law. For a more detailed discussion of termino-
logical distinctions between related causes of actions where an individual's negli-
gence results in the birth of a child, see Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp.
544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1981).
17. See id. ("Uludicial adherence to this terminology has not been uniform,
with many courts utilizing the term 'wrongful birth' to describe 'wrongful preg-
nancy' claims.").
18. See id. (" '[W]rongful birth' actions ... usually involve planned children
who are born deformed.").
19. See, e.g., id. at 547 (physician failed to inform parents of likelihood that
child would be born with Down's Syndrome where mother noted on prenatal
questionnaire that her sister was afflicted with the disease); Atlanta Obstetrics &
Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 195 Ga. App. 274, 274, 392 S.E.2d 916, 917-18
(1990) (physicians failed to advise plaintiffs of increased risks of genetic abnor-
malities associated with mother's age and failed to perform amniocentesis in or-
der to detect whether unborn child had Down's Syndrome). The theory
underlying an action for wrongful birth is that the defendant physician's negli-
gence precluded an informed decision by the parents about whether to have the
child. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1981) (citing
1991] NOTE 807
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action. 20
A "wrongful life" action also involves a child born with defects as a
result of a physician's negligence in either failing to detect the defects or
failure to inform the parents of the likelihood of their baby having some
type of abnormality. 2 1 This cause of action differs from an action for
wrongful birth in only one respect: an action for wrongful life is insti-
tuted by the child rather than by the parents. 22 Most courts, however,
are reluctant to recognize this cause of action, asserting that the action
requires an impossible weighing of the value of no life against the value
of life with defects. 23 Additionally, a number of state legislatures have
enacted statutes prohibiting actions for wrongful life. 24
A "wrongful pregnancy" action is one brought by parents for dam-
ages where a normal, healthy child is born as the result of a defendant's
negligence. 25 Wrongful pregnancy actions can be broken into two cate-
gories. The first category consists of cases where the defendant's negli-
gence leads to the conception of a child; cases in this category are also
referred to as actions for "wrongful conception." Such actions normally
arise in one of two ways: (1) a physician is negligent in performing a
sterilization procedure (usually a tubal ligation or vasectomy); 26 or (2) a
Comment, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 484 (1980)). Had the parents been properly
advised of the presence, or risk, of a birth defect in their unborn or potential
child, the parents could have avoided conception or terminated the pregnancy.
Id.
20. See, e.g., Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 195 Ga.
App. 274, 274-75, 392 S.E.2d 916, 918 ("In those states wherein the legislature
has not acted, 'most courts... have been more receptive to the parents' wrong-
ful birth claims[] after the Supreme Court's legalization of abortion in 1973, and
there is by now quite general agreement that the parents should be permitted to
recover at least their pecuniary losses .... '" (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 1, § 55, at 371)). But see Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741
(Mo.) (no cause of action exists for wrongful birth), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893
(1988).
21. See Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 545. For a general discussion of wrongful
life and wrongful birth claims, see T. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY
IN THE '90S §§ 8.17-.18 (1990).
22. See Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 545.
23. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per
curiam) (evenly divided court affirmed order of Superior Court that plaintiff
child's wrongful life action not legally cognizable); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp.,
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (court refused to recognize cause of
action for wrongful life due to impossibility of calculating damages).
24. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989) ("No person shall
maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of that
person based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, the
person would have been aborted."); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-55-1 (1987)
("There shall be no cause of action or award of damages on behalf of any person
based on the claim of that person that, but for the conduct of another, he would
not have been conceived or, once conceived, would not have been permitted to
be born alive.").
25. See Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 545 n. 1.
26. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 263, 473 A.2d 429, 432
808
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pharmacist is negligent in filling a prescription for birth control pills. 2 7
The second category of wrongful pregnancy actions consists of cases
where, as a result of the defendant's negligence, the mother carries the
child to full term. This type of action usually involves a failed abortion
procedure. 2 8
The Burke case involved an action for wrongful pregnancy or, more
specifically, for wrongful conception. Courts have taken four distinct
approaches in cases involving wrongful pregnancy. 29 One approach is
to decline to recognize a cause of action.3 0 Presently, Nevada is the only
jurisdiction that follows this approach. 3 1 The rationale for denying re-
covery is that there is no wrong which must be redressed; the birth of a
normal, healthy child is not considered an injury as a matter of law. 32
(1984) (physician liable for wrongful conception due to negligently performed
tubal ligation); University of Ariz. Health Sciences v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (physician liable for wrongful pregnancy due to neg-
ligently performed vasectomy); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala.
1982) (physician liable for wrongful pregnancy due to negligently performed
removal of fallopian tubes); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170
(Minn. 1977) (physician liable for wrongful conception due to negligently per-
formed vasectomy).
27. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 252, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513-
14 (1971) (cause of action existed against pharmacist for negligently supplying
wrong drug to married woman who ordered oral contraceptive, resulting in
birth of normal, healthy child).
28. See, e.g., Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 1984) (parent of
normal, healthy child could not recover child rearing expenses from physician
whose alleged negligence in performing therapeutic abortion led to birth of
child).
29. For an overview of the development of the four approaches to wrongful
pregnancy and wrongful conception actions, see Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted
Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1410-16 (1977).
30. See Szekeres v. Robinson, 102 Nev. 93, 715 P.2d 1076 (1986). Szekeres
arose out of an allegedly failed sterilization procedure performed on the mother,
Phyllis, which led to the birth of a healthy baby girl, Erica. Id. at 94, 715 P.2d at
1076. Phyllis sued the attending physicians and the hospital on her own behalf,
as well as on behalf of her other children, claiming to have been injured by Er-
ica's birth. Id. Phyllis's husband, Peter, also joined the suit, asking for damages
caused by Phyllis's unavailability during the pregnancy. Id. The trial court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' tort and contract claims. Id. at 94-95, 715 P.2d at 1076-77.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful pregnancy
action, but remanded the case for consideration of the breach of contract claim.
Id.
31. See Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d at 54, 540 N.E.2d
1370, 1373 (1989) ("Nevada is currently the only jurisdiction to adhere to this
absolute position of no tort recovery in a 'wrongful pregnancy' action."); Smith
v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Tenn. 1987) (Nevada is only jurisdiction to ad-
here to absolutist position of refusing to recognize tort of wrongful pregnancy).
32. Szekeres, at 96-97, 715 P.2d at 1078. In Szekeres, the Nevada Supreme
Court stated:
Many courts have taken for granted that normal birth is an injuri-
ous and damaging consequence and have disagreed only on the "how
much" part of such claims. We do not take the wrongness nor the inju-
riousness of the birth event for granted and say, to the contrary, that
5
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Courts that follow the other three approaches to a wrongful preg-
nancy action are consistent in their recognition of a cause of action, but
differ as to what damages are recoverable. The second approach to
wrongful pregnancy actions permits certain limited damages to be re-
covered, but denies recovery for child rearing costs.33 This "limitation
of damages" approach is the majority view.3 4 Jurisdictions that follow
this approach typically allow recovery for: (1) the medical and hospital
expenses due to the pregnancy and birth; (2) the cost of the original
sterilization procedure; (3) the cost of re-sterilization, if desired;
(4) pain and suffering connected with the pregnancy and birth; (5) the
father's loss of consortium; and (6) the mother's lost wages.3 5
Courts that follow the limitation of damages approach point to a
number of reasons for denying recovery of child rearing expenses.
Many maintain that awarding child rearing costs would have a negative
impact on the stability of the family unit.5 6 Additionally, courts often
opine that it would be emotionally harmful to the child to learn not only
that he was unwanted, but also that the funds used to raise him were
supplied by another.3 7 Other courts deny child rearing costs on the the-
ory that the benefits of raising a child outweigh the monetary burdens.3 8
normal birth is not a wrong, it is a 'right.' It is an event which, of itself,
is not a legally compensable injurious consequence even if the birth is
partially attributable to the negligent conduct of someone purporting
to be able to prevent the eventuality of childbirth.
Id. at 97, 715 P.2d at 1078. The Szekeres court held that "in Nevada, the birth of
a normal child is not a civil wrong for which the court will provide a remedy in
the form of an action for damages." Id. at 95, 715 P.2d at 1077.
33. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982) (child rearing
costs not recoverable in wrongful pregnancy action); see also Macomber v. Dill-
man, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986) (child rearing costs not recoverable in case
involving failed sterilization procedure which resulted in birth of normal,
healthy child).
34. Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 55, 540 N.E.2d 1370,
1375 (1989) ("The vast majority ofjurisdictions which have decided the issue [of
what damages are recoverable in a wrongful pregnancy action] adheres to [a]
theory of damages which denies all child-rearing expenses.").
35. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982) (parents
may recover damages for medical and hospital expenses connected with preg-
nancy, mother's physical pain and suffering and mental anguish and father's loss
of comfort, companionship, services and consortium); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122
N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982) (recoverable damages in wrongful
pregnancy action include medical and hospital expenses of pregnancy, cost of
sterilization, pain and suffering connected with pregnancy, loss of mother's
wages and father's loss of consortium).
36. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385
(1983) (permitting parents to, in effect, transfer costs of raising child to negli-
gent physician would run counter to public policy commanding preservation of
family relations); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C.
1984) ("[Plermitting parents to initiate litigation to force a third person to rear
financially their child has a potentially destabilizing effect on families.").
37. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982).
38. See Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist.
810 [Vol. 36: p. 805
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Some courts refuse to award the costs of child-rearing because the plain-
tiffs have failed to avail themselves of the opportunities for mitigation,
referring to abortion and adoption.3 9 Various practical problems with
awarding child rearing costs (such as the speculative nature of such costs
and the difficulty in determining a just or sensible stopping point) and a
fear of fraudulent claims are also cited by courts as reasons for adopting
the limitation of damages approach. 40
The third approach to wrongful pregnancy actions allows the par-
ents to recover, in addition to the damages associated with the preg-
nancy and birth, the costs of rearing their unplanned child offset by the
value of the child's aid, comfort and society during the parents' life-
time.41 A minority ofjurisdictions follow this approach, which is gener-
ally referred to as the "benefit rule." '4 2
Ct. App. 1980) ("[I]t is a matter of universally-shared emotion and sentiment
that the intangible but all-important, incalculable but invaluable 'benefits' of
parenthood far outweigh any of the mere monetary burdens involved."); See also
Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522-23 (Iowa 1984) (public policy of Iowa
dictates that "a parent cannot be said to have been damaged or injured by the
birth and rearing of a normal, healthy child because the invaluable benefits of
parenthood outweigh the mere monetary burdens as a matter of law").
39. See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983) (court stated
that "in a pure legal sense, the parents have failed to mitigate the damages
which they charge"); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982)
(court noted problem with assessment of damages in wrongful pregnancy ac-
tions due to conflict between state mitigation requirement and moral issues of
abortion and adoption). This view is based upon the avoidable consequences
doctrine of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918. Section 918 states that "one
injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm
that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after
the commission of the tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
40. See, e.g., McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 419, 687 P.2d 850,
855 (1984) (parents may not recover child rearing expenses in wrongful preg-
nancy action due to impossibility of determining costs of raising child with rea-
sonable certainty); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
In Beardsley, the Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that allowing recov-
ery for child rearing costs in a wrongful pregnancy action places an unreasona-
ble burden on the defendants. 650 P.2d at 292. The court stated that allowing
claims for the damages or expenses incurred after the birth of the child is "likely
[to] open the way for fraudulent claims, and ... enter a field that has no sensible
or just stopping point." Id. Additionally, the Beardsley court held that the injury
in such an action is too remote from the negligence and is out of proportion to
the culpability of the tortfeasors. Id.
41. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435
(1984) (trier of fact permitted to award parents costs of raising healthy child to
age of majority offset by benefits received from child's aid, society and comfort);
University of Ariz. Health Sciences v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 586, 667
P.2d 1294, 1301 (1983) (plaintiffs may recover pecuniary and non-pecuniary fu-
ture costs of raising and educating child offset by pecuniary and non-pecuniary
benefits which inure to plaintiffs as result of their relationship to child).
42. The term "benefit rule" is derived from the Restatement (Second) § 920,
"Benefit to Plaintiff Resulting from Defendant's Tort." Section 920 states that
[w]hen the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plain-
19911 NOTIE
7
Garfinkle: Burke v. Rivo: Toward a More Rational Approach to Wrongful Pregna
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
812 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36: p. 805
Courts that utilize the benefit rule reject the majority view that child
rearing costs are too speculative to be awarded and instead hold that the
award of such costs simply requires a routine calculation of reasonably
foreseeable expenses to maintain, educate and support the child
through majority. 43 In the view of these courts, the difficulty in calculat-
ing an award is not a legitimate reason to deny just compensation to a
victim of negligence. 44 The benefit rule approach also discounts the ar-
gument that allowing child rearing costs will emotionally harm the sub-
ject child or create family instability.45 This approach recognizes that
the plaintiffs in a wrongful pregnancy action are seeking damages not
because they do not love their child, but because the defendant's negli-
gence has thrust burdens upon them which they sought to avoid. 46 In
addition, courts that advocate the benefit rule have noted that family
planning is not against contemporary public policy; therefore, parents
should be compensated when their wish to limit the size of their family is
tiff or to his property and in doing so has conferred a special benefit to
the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit
conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this
is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 920.
43. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A.2d 429, 436
(1984). Injustifying its use of the benefit rule, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
opined that
child rearing costs ... are neither too unquantifiable nor too specula-
tive to deny their recovery under settled rules applied by the cases.
The computation of such costs requires a routine calculation of reason-
ably foreseeable expenses that will be incurred by the parents to main-
tain, support and educate the child to majority age. Such calculations
are based on well-recognized economic factors regularly made by actu-
aries for estate planners and insurance companies; indeed, the ex-
penses associated with raising a child are well appreciated by the
average citizen through first-hand experience.
Id. See also Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) ("In
the case of a normal, healthy child, we would anticipate that these expenses
could not ordinarily be projected beyond the age of [the unplanned child's] ma-
jority, for it is at that age that the parental duty to support ceases.").
44. University of Ariz. Health Sciences v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579,
586, 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 (1983) (although right to damages must be estab-
lished by plaintiff without speculation, recovery will not be precluded merely
because amount uncertain).
45. For a discussion of the view that awarding child rearing damages will
not harm the subject child, see infra notes 46, 58-59 & 108-11 and accompanying
text.
46. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (1984). The
Jones court found that the damages claimed in a wrongful pregnancy action bear
no relation to the child's value or worth to the family. Id. The court recognized
that "[t]he parents seek damages, not because they do not love and want to keep
the unplanned child, but because the direct, foreseeable and natural conse-
quences of the physician's negligence has [sic] forced upon them burdens which
they sought and had a right to avoid by submitting to sterilization." Id.
8
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frustrated by the negligence of another. 4 7 At least one court adopting
the benefit rule has suggested that a right to recovery exists based upon
a fundamental constitutional right not to procreate, 48 citing the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut4 9 and Roe v.
Wade.50
Lastly, those courts that apply the benefit rule reject the notion that
the issue of mitigation should be considered when calculating the dam-
ages in a wrongful pregnancy action.5 ' The avoidable consequences
doctrine articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 918, upon
which the mitigation requirement is based, requires "the use of reason-
able effort or expenditure" by the plaintiff to mitigate any damages. 52
These courts hold that the options of adoption and abortion, both in-
tensely personal decisions, are not "reasonable" methods of mitigation
as a matter of law.
53
47. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977). In
Sherlock, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that
[t]he use of various birth control methods by millions of Americans
demonstrates an acceptance of the family-planning concept as an inte-
gral aspect of the modern marital relationship, so that today it must be
acknowledged that the time-honored command to "be fruitful and mul-
tiply" has not only lost contemporary significance to a growing number
of potential parents but is contrary to public policies embodied in the
statutes encouraging family planning.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. The Sherlock court stated that "[r]ecent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, moreover, seem to suggest that the right to limit procrea-
tion is of a constitutional dimension." Id.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court held
that a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 485. The Court found that "[a] zone of privacy [is] created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights."
Id. The Court concluded that the right to use contraceptives lies within this
zone of privacy. Id. at 485.
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the United States Supreme Court held
that the right of personal privacy was broad enough to encompass the decision
to have an abortion. Id. at 153. The Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion
by explaining that although "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy... [this] Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Consti-
tution." Id. at 152. The Court further stated that previous decisions "make it
clear that the right [of privacy] has some extension to activities relating to ...
procreation... [and] contraception." Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541-42 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)).
51. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977). The
Sherlock court stated that "the refusal of a mother to submit to an abortion or of
the parents to give their child up for adoption should not be regarded as a fail-
ure on the part of the parents to mitigate damages." Id.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 918. For the text of § 918, see supra note 39.
53. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 274, 473 A.2d 429, 438
(1984). The Maryland Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of law, neither
abortion nor adoption is a reasonable course of action in mitigation, and there-
fore, neither one is required of the plaintiffs. Id. The court stated, "[t]he best
interest of the child, and the natural instincts of the parent, make it unreasona-
1991] NOTE 813
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The fourth approach to wrongful pregnancy actions permits recov-
ery of all damages, including all child rearing costs, without offset for
any value to the parents of the child's aid, comfort and society.54 Only
one jurisdiction has currently adopted this view. 55 In Marciniak v. Lund-
borg,5 6 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin articulated a number of reasons
for holding that full damages are recoverable. The Wisconsin court rea-
soned that recovery should not be precluded on the grounds that dam-
ages are too speculative, pointing out that juries frequently make more
complex damage assessments in other negligence actions. 5 7 Addition-
ally, the court decided that allowing the recovery of child rearing costs
ble to require parents to submit the child in the womb to abortion, or the child
in the crib to adoption." Id. (quoting Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 866
(Ky. 1983) (Leibson, J., dissenting)).
54. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 64, 450 N.W.2d 243, 245
(1990) (parents may recover all child rearing costs in wrongful pregnancy
action).
55. See id. at 74, 450 N.W.2d at 249. The appellate court of Illinois, in a
much cited case, also permitted the recovery of full damages in an action where
a negligent sterilization led to the birth of a normal, healthy child. See Cockrum
v. Baumgartner, 99 111. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981), rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d 193,
447 N.E.2d 385 (1983). The decision, however, was subsequently reversed on
appeal, with the Supreme Court of Illinois adopting the limited damages rule.
See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 200, 205, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389, 391
(1983).
Although no jurisdiction other than Wisconsin has adopted the full recovery
approach, many state court judges have urged the adoption of this measure of
damages. See, e.g, Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 61, 540
N.E.2d 1370, 1380 (1989) (Brown, J., dissenting) (in wrongful pregnancy ac-
tions, "court should follow well-established principles of tort law and allow the
plaintiff to recover the readily measurable damages which were previously
caused by the defendants' negligence"); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478
A.2d 1073, 1081 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J., dissenting) (full recovery for wrongful
pregnancy should be permitted if mother proves election of sterilization solely
for economic reasons and presents expert evidence of reasonable child rearing
costs); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 496, 453 A.2d 974, 980-81
(1982) (Larsen, J., dissenting) (parents of unplanned child should be permitted
to recover full cost of raising child to age of majority).
56. 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990). In Marciniak, the plaintiff,
Paula Marciniak, underwent a tubal ligation in order to avoid having further chil-
dren. Id. at 62, 450 N.W.2d at 244. Marciniak had used birth control pills prior
to the sterilization procedure, but underwent the surgical procedure because she
desired to discontinue use of the pill and was led to believe that the surgical
procedure would be permanent. Id. Two years after the operation, Marciniak
gave birth to a normal, healthy child. Id.
Marciniak and her husband brought an action against the defendant physi-
cian, and others, to recover the costs of raising their unplanned child. Id. at 63,
450 N.W.2d at 244. The defendants then sought dismissal of the Marciniaks'
claim for child rearing expenses. Id. Although the trial court ruled that such
expenses are recoverable, the Wisconsin court of appeals reversed, concluding
that recovery was barred by public policy. Id. The Wisconsin supreme court,
however, reversed the court of appeals's decision and held that parents may re-
cover all child rearing costs in wrongful pregnancy actions. Id. at 64, 450
N.W.2d at 245.
57. Id. at 66, 450 N.W.2d at 245-46. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
[Vol. 36: p. 805814
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would not emotionally harm the child because "[t]he suit is for costs of
raising the child, not to rid [the parents] of an unwanted child."' 58 In
fact, the Wisconsin court continued, "[rlelieving the family of the eco-
nomic costs of raising the child may well add to the emotional well-being
of the entire family."'59 The Marciniak court also found that no mitiga-
tion in the form of adoption .or abortion was required of the plaintiffs. 60
The Wisconsin court also reasoned that the defendants should not be
immunized from liability for foreseeable damages simply because the
damages at issue were substantial. 6 1 Therefore, the court held that, in
the absence of public policy considerations to the contrary, it was re-
found the contention that child rearing costs were too speculative to be awarded
to be without merit because
Uluries are frequently called on to make far more complex damage as-
sessments in other tort cases. There may thus actually be a less specu-
lative calculation involved than in many other malpractice actions which
are routinely allowed, such as those involving pain, suffering, and
mental anguish. Population studies are readily available to provide
figures for the costs of raising a child.
Id. at 66, 450 N.W.2d at 246.
58. Id. at 67, 450 N.W.2d at 246. The Marciniak court disagreed with the
defendant's contention that awarding child rearing costs may psychologically
harm the child when the child learns of the action for wrongful pregnancy. The
court declared that
[the parents] obviously want to keep the child. The love, affection and
emotional support any child needs they are prepared to give. But the
love, affection and emotional support they are prepared to give do not
bring with them the economic means that are also necessary to feed,
clothe, educate and otherwise raise the child. That is what this suit is
about and we trust the child in the future will be well able to distinguish
the two.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 69, 450 N.W.2d at 247. In rejecting the defendant's contention
that the parents' refusal to abort the healthy child or put it up for adoption
constituted a failure to mitigate damages, the Wisconsin court stated that
[t]he rules requiring mitigation of damages require only that reason-
able measures be taken. We do not consider it reasonable to expect
parents to essentially choose between the child and the cause of action.
That would truly be a "Hobson's choice." In addition, the decisions
concerning abortion or adoption are highly personal matters and in-
volve deeply held moral or religious convictions. For these reasons,
courts have typically rejected the argument that parents must select
either abortion or adoption as a method of mitigation, and we concur.
Id. (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 66, 450 N.W.2d at 246. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected
the defendant's argument that an award of the costs of raising a child would be
wholly out of proportion to his culpability. Id. While noting that child rearing
costs are significant, the court stated that "the public policy of [Wisconsin] does
not categorically immunize defendants from liability for foreseeable damages
merely because the damages may be substantial. Individuals often seek steriliza-
tion precisely because the burdens of raising a child are substantial and they are
not in a position to incur them." Id. Additionally, the Wisconsin court noted
that "in recent cases where the courts have reported the amount of the child
rearing damages either requested or awarded to the plaintiffs, such amounts
11
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quired to apply traditional rules governing tort damages to recovery in
negligent sterilization actions. 62
The Wisconsin court then addressed whether the benefit rule
should be applied to wrongful pregnancy actions. The court concluded
that "it is not equitable to apply the benefit rule in the context of the tort
of negligent sterilization."'6 3 The court reasoned that, since any benefits
conferred upon the parents due to the birth of the unplanned child were
not asked for and actually were sought to be avoided, it would be unfair
not only to force these benefits upon the parents, but also to require the
parents to pay for the benefits by offsetting them against their proven
damages.64
III. DISCUSSION: BURKE v. Rivo
In 1983, Carole Burke underwent a tubal ligation prompted by her
desire not to have more children because of her family's financial diffi-
culties.6 5 Approximately two years later, Burke gave birth to a healthy,
normal child.6 6 Burke and her husband then sued the physician who
had performed the tubal ligation based on a theory of negligent per-
have not approached the awards for other serious torts." Id. at 66-67, 450
N.W.2d at 246.
62. Id. at 71, 450 N.W.2d at 248. Expanding on its conclusion that ordinary
rules of tort damages should apply to wrongful pregnancy actions, the Marciniak
court found that
[o]ne of the basic principles of traditional damages is the concept that
the wrongdoer compensate those who are injured by his or her negli-
gence. Where the purpose of the physician's actions is to prevent con-
ception through sterilization, and the physician's actions are performed
negligently, traditional principles of tort law require that the physician
be held legally responsible for the consequences which have in fact oc-
curred. We therefore conclude that the parents of a healthy child may
recover the costs of raising the child from a physician who negligently
performs a sterilization.
Id.
63. Id. at 73, 540 N.W.2d at 249.
64. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that
[t]he parents made a decision not to have a child. It was precisely to
avoid that "benefit" that the parents went to the physician in the first
place. Any "benefits" that were conferred upon them as a result of
having a new child in their lives were not asked for and were sought to
be avoided. With respect to emotional benefits, potential parents in
this situation are presumably well aware of the emotional benefits that
might accrue to them as a result of a new child in their lives. When
parents make the decision to forego this opportunity for emotional en-
richment, it hardly seems equitable to not only force this benefit upon
them but to tell them they must pay for it as well by offsetting it against
their proven emotional damages. With respect to economic benefits,
the same argument prevails. In addition, any economic advantages the
child might confer upon the parents are ordinarily insignificant.
Id. at 73-74, 450 N.W.2d at 249.
65. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 765, 551 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1990).
66. Id. at 766, 551 N.E.2d at 2.
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formance of a sterilization. 6 7 In Burke v. Rivo, 68 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of the proper measure of
damages in a negligent sterilization action. 69
The Burke court agreed with the weight of authority that liability
may attach for "negligently performing a sterilization procedure when
the result is the conception of a child [or] ... negligently failing to ad-
vise a patient of the risks of conceiving a child following a particular
sterilization operation . . . ; [or] . . . breach[ing] . . . a guarantee that
following a sterilization procedure there would be no further preg-
nancy." 70 The court stated that damages in such an action would in-
clude the costs of the unsuccessful sterilization and of any re-
sterilization procedure, the costs directly flowing from the pregnancy,
the wife's lost earning capacity, the medical expenses of the delivery and
care following the birth, the cost of care for any other children while
their mother was incapacitated, the husband's loss of consortium, the
wife's pain and suffering and any emotional distress resulting from the
unwanted pregnancy. 71
The Burke court then addressed the issue at hand: "[W]hether the
plaintiffs are [also] entitled, if they establish liability, to the cost of rais-
ing their child."' 72 The court held that parents may recover the costs of
rearing a normal, healthy, but unwanted, child; no public policy consid-
eration dictated that damages should be limited.73 The court, however,
limited its holding to cases where the parents elected sterilization based
67. Id.
68. 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
69. Id. at 764-65, 551 N.E.2d at 1-2. The superior court judge reported the
question of law concerning damages to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. Id.
The case was then transferred to the supreme court on its own motion. Id. at
765, 551 N.E.2d at 2.
The question reported by the trial judge was: "What is the measure of dam-
ages in an action claiming (a) breach of a guarantee that a surgical procedure
would forever prevent pregnancy; and (b) negligence in performing that proce-
dure, where the child born as a result of the pregnancy was in every way normal
and healthy?" Id. at 765 n.2, 551 N.E.2d at 2 n.2. The supreme court assumed
that the subject child was in every way normal and healthy for the purpose of
deciding the damages question. Id.
70. Id. at 766, 551 N.E.2d at 2-3.
71. Id. at 768, 551 N.E.2d at 3-4.
72. Id. at 769, 551 N.E.2d at 4. The Massachusetts Supreme Court recog-
nized that "[u]nder normal tort and contract principles, th[e] cost [of child rear-
ing] is both a reasonably foreseeable and a natural and probable consequence of
the wrongs that the plaintiffs allege." Id. The court concluded that it must dis-
cern "whether there is any public policy consideration to which [it] should give
effect to limit traditional tort and contract damages." Id.
73. Id. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6. The Burke court concluded that "no reason
founded on sound public policy [existed] to immunize a physician from having
to pay for a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his negligence or from a
natural and probable consequence of a breach of his guarantee, namely the par-
ents' expenses in rearing the child to adulthood." Id. at 772-73, 551 N.E.2d at 6.
1991] NoTE
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upon economic or financial considerations.?7 Additionally, the court
concluded that where recovery is permitted, the trier of fact should off-
set any benefit the parents will receive from raising their normal, healthy
child against the cost of rearing.7 5 The Burke court thus adopted the
benefit rule. 76
The Burke court dismissed as "outstandingly unimpressive" many of
the justifications for denying recovery of child rearing costs cited by
other courts. 77 The court rejected the "judicial declaration" that the joy
and pride in raising a normal, healthy child will always outweigh the eco-
nomic burdens. 78 In finding that the birth of a child is not always a net
benefit, the court acknowledged that
[t]he very fact that a person has sought medical intervention to
prevent him or her from having a child demonstrates that, for
that person, the benefits of parenthood did not outweigh the
burdens, economic and otherwise, of having a child. The ex-
tensive use of contraception and sterilization and the perform-
ance of numerous abortions each year show that, in some
instances, large numbers of people do not accept parenthood
as a net positive circumstance. 79
The court also refused to use the availability of abortion or adoption as a
basis upon which to limit the damages a defendant physician must pay.8 0
The Burke court rejected the reasoning of the majority of jurisdic-
tions that awarding child rearing costs would adversely affect the
child.8 ' The court noted that although many courts express concern
about the effect on the subject child if the child learns that someone else
has paid for his or her support, they nevertheless allow the recovery of
certain other expenses from which the child could just as surely learn
that he or she was not wanted.8 2 The Burke court found that "[tihe once
unwanted child's knowledge that someone other than the parents had
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. For a discussion of the benefit rule approach to wrongful pregnancy
actions, see supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
77. Burke, 406 Mass. at 769, 551 N.E.2d at 4.
78. Id. (citing Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982) ("The
birth of a healthy child, and the joy and pride in rearing that child are benefits
on which no price tag can be placed. This joy far outweighs any economic loss
that might be suffered by the parents.")).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 770, 551 N.E.2d at 4. The Burke court "firmly reject[ed] any sug-
gestion that the availability of abortion or of adoption furnishes a basis for limit-
ing damages payable by a physician but for whose negligence the child would
not have been conceived." Id.
81. Id. For a discussion of the view that allowing full damages in a wrongful
birth action will result in future emotional harm to the subject child, see supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
82. Burke, 406 Mass. at 770, 551 N.E.2d at 4. For a discussion of damages
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been obliged to pay the cost of rearing him or her may in fact alleviate
the child's distress at the knowledge of having once been unwanted." 83
Lastly, the court rejected the arguments that child rearing costs are too
speculative or are unreasonably disproportionate to the doctor's culpa-
bility. 84 The Burke court, however, restricted the recovery of child rear-
ing costs to cases where the parents chose sterilization for economic
reasons.8 5 The court declared that
[i]f the parents' desire to avoid the birth of a child was founded
on eugenic reasons (avoidance of a feared genetic defect) or
was founded on therapeutic reasons (concern for the mother's
health) and if a healthy normal baby is born, the justification for
allowing recovery of the costs of rearing a normal child to ma-
turity is far less than when, to conserve family resources, the
parents sought unsuccessfully to avoid conceiving another
child. 86
IV. ANALYSIS
All costs directly and foreseeably arising out of a wrongful preg-
nancy action, including child rearing expenses, should be recoverable.
Approaches allowing less than full recovery of all costs or refusing to
recognize a cause of action altogether constitute a departure from tradi-
tional tort law and lead to an increased risk of negligence by physi-
cians. 8 7 Additionally, the public policy considerations cited by the
that are recoverable in jurisdictions following the limited damages approach, see
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
83. Burke, 406 Mass. at 770, 551 N.E.2d at 4-5. The Massachusetts court
concluded that "[iun any event, it is for the parents, not the courts, to decide
whether a lawsuit would adversely affect the child and should not be main-
tained." Id.
84. Id. at 770-71, 551 N.E.2d at 5. The Burke court stated that
[t]he determination of the anticipated costs of child-rearing is no more
complicated or fanciful than many calculations of future losses made
every day in tort cases. If a physician is negligent in caring for a new-
born child, damage calculations would be made concerning the new-
born's earning capacity and expected medical expenses over an entire
lifetime. The expenses of rearing a child are far more easily deter-
mined. If there is any justification for denying recovery of normal tort
damages in a case of this character, it is not that the cost of rearing a
child is incapable of reasonable calculation or is too great to impose on
a negligent physician.
Id. at 771, 551 N.E.2d at 5.
85. Id. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6.
86. Id. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 5.
87. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977). In
Sherlock, the Supreme Court of Minnesota recognized that
[a]nalytically. ... an action [for a negligently performed sterilization] is
indistinguishable from an ordinary medical negligence action where a
plaintiff alleges that a physician has breached a duty of care owed to
him with resulting injurious consequences. Where the purpose of the
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majority of courts do not establish a rational basis on which to deny
plaintiffs in these cases their just compensation. 88
A wrongful pregnancy action is based on a traditional tort theory of
negligence. 89 Logically, therefore, fundamental rules governing tort
damages should apply. A wrongful pregnancy plaintiff who proves the
tort elements of duty, breach of duty and causation should be fully com-
pensated for all damages suffered.90 Additionally, the general tort prin-
ciple that an injured plaintiff should be placed as nearly as possible in
the position he or she would have occupied had it not been for the de-
fendant's negligence 9 ' should apply to wrongful pregnancy actions. In
the case of the plaintiffs in a wrongful pregnancy action, that position is
one where they do not have the burden of paying the costs of rearing an
additional, unplanned child.
There are also policy reasons for allowing full recovery in wrongful
pregnancy actions. It is only through the imposition of standards of care
on individuals that society is protected from the results of careless or
reckless behavior. Therefore, it is imperative that all negligent defend-
ants be held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their negli-
gent acts. Under the present majority approach, where courts deny
recovery of child-rearing expenses as damages in wrongful pregnancy
actions, physicians are held liable for the foreseeable consequences of
all negligently performed operations except those involving steriliza-
physician's action is to prevent conception or birth, elementary justice
requires that he be held legally responsible for the consequences which
have in fact occurred.
Id. at 174. The court concluded that "[c]ompensatory damages for the cost of
rearing the child to the age of majority would... serve the useful purpose of an
added deterrent to negligent performance of sterilization operations." Id. at
175.
88. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 70-71, 450 N.W.2d 243,
248 (1990). The Marciniak court rejected as unpersuasive the various public pol-
icy notions on which the majority of jurisdictions rest their adherence to the
limited damages approach. Id. at 65-71, 450 N.W.2d at 245-48. For a discus-
sion of the Marciniak court's treatment of these policy arguments, see supra notes
57-62 and accompanying text.
89. See Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 174 (wrongful pregnancy actions indistin-
guishable from ordinary medical malpractice actions); see also Jones v. Malinow-
ski, 299 Md. 257, 263, 473 A.2d 429, 432 (1984) ("there is a cause of action in
tort based upon traditional medical malpractice principles for negligence in the
performance of a sterilization procedure").
90. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed.
1984); see also University of Ariz. Health Sciences v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579, 585, 667 P.2d 1294, 1300 (1983) (court recognized that "[olne of the basic
principles of damage law is the concept that a wrongdoer may be held liable for
all damages which he may have caused and all costs which the victim may sustain
as a result of the wrong") (emphasis added).
91. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS supra note 1, § 1, at 5-6; see Sherlock, 260
N.W.2d at 175 (court recognized "the elementary principle of compensatory
damages which seeks to place injured plaintiffs in the position that they would
have been had no wrong occurred").
820 [Vol. 36: p. 805
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/3
1991]
tion. This approach discourages physicians from taking any added pre-
cautions to ensure conformance with a reasonable standard of care, and
thus leads to more negligent sterilizations and the conception of more
unwanted, or at least unplanned, children.9 2
The refusal of courts to award full damages, including child rearing
expenses, for an unplanned child in this situation is more than simply an
additional expense; it is also a violation of a constitutionally protected
right. 93 This constitutional question often arises in the wrongful preg-
nancy context because many of these actions involve sterilizations per-
formed by state-subsidized clinics. The choice not to procreate is
guaranteed against governmental interference as part of the fundamen-
tal right to privacy contained in the United States Constitution.9 4 When
courts refuse to award full damages in wrongful pregnancy actions, they
violate the Constitution by interfering with a woman's right not to have
children.
Courts that allow less than full recovery in wrongful pregnancy ac-
tions cite no rational basis for denying these plaintiffs just compensation
for their injuries. Those courts that declare that no cause of action ex-
92. See Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175. The Sherlock court concluded that
"[clompensatory damages for the cost of rearing the child to the age of majority
would ... serve the useful purpose of an added deterrent to negligent perform-
ance of sterilization of operations," as well as "reinforce the physician's duty of
due care from the outset of the physician-patient relationship." Id.; see also PROS-
SER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, § 4, at 25. This noted source of authority
states that
[t]he "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been quite
important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with
compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.
When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants real-
ize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to
prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for
imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.
Id.
93. See, e.g., Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175 ("Recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court... seem to suggest that the right to limit procreation is of
a constitutional dimension."); Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49,
59-60, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1379 (1989) (Brown, J., dissenting). InJohnson, Justice
Brown stated in dissent that
the choice not to procreate, as part of one's right to privacy, has be-
come (subject to certain limitations) a Constitutional guarantee. For
this court to endorse a policy that makes physicians liable for the foreseeable conse-
quences of all negligently performed operations except those involving sterilization
would'constitute an impermissible infringement of a fundamental right.
Id. at 60, 540 N.E.2d at 1379 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting
Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (emphasis
added)).
94. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional right to privacy
encompasses woman's decision to terminate pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (fundamental right to privacy exists and encompasses
married couple's decision to use contraception). For a discussion of the right to
privacy, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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ists because the birth of a normal, healthy child is not a wrong or an
injury that must be redressed have injected their own moral and ethical
judgments into the law.95 It is not a court's job to dictate what public
policy should be regarding the birth of an unplanned, but healthy,
child.9 6 A court's only job is to interpret the law. 97 Basic public policy
formulation is the function of the legislative branch. Courts should ap-
ply the traditional common law tort principle of compensation for
wrongful conduct in wrongful pregnancy actions. If the application of
these existing tort principles is contrary to the state's public policy, then
the legislature can step in and legislate against wrongful pregnancy ac-
tions. The practice of courts refusing compensation, however, is inap-
propriate. This point is particularly strong given that United States
Supreme Court decisions have struck down laws that impermissibly in-
fringed on the right to decide not to have a child. 98
Courts that follow the limited damages rule in wrongful pregnancy
actions rationalize their adherence to this majority approach with faulty
reasoning. Many of these jurisdictions deny full recovery on the basis
that the costs of raising a child are too speculative to be awarded. 99 This
belief, however, is not a sound rationale for denying such compensation
to wrongful pregnancy plaintiffs. Child rearing expenses are not too
speculative to be calculated; with today's sophistication in analyzing fi-
nancial and economic trends, the cost of raising a child to majority can
95. See, e.g.,Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 540 N.E.2d at 1378 (Brown, J.,
dissenting). Dissenting from the Ohio Supreme Court's adoption of the limited
damages approach to wrongful pregnancy actions, Justice Brown recognized:
The decision not to have children or to limit the size of a family is
the lawful prerogative of any couple and of any mother. Our charge is
not to weigh the moral values in making that choice. It is not for us to
decide whether a couple errs when they elect to have no children. It is
not for us to say whether a couple with three children makes a wise
choice when they decide to have no more children in order to concen-
trate their resources on adequate support for the existing children.
Id. (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown further stated that "[tio inject the un-
measurable value of a human life (the baby) into the argument is to charge the
issues with misdirected emotion." Id. at 60, 540 N.E.2d at 1380 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
96. See Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 815-16 (Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is the duty of this Court to fol-
low public policy, not to formulate it, absent a clear expression of public
opinion.").
97. See Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (Pearson,J., dissenting) ("judges are more to be trusted as interpret-
ers of the law than as expounders of what is called public policy").
98. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing woman's constitu-
tional right to terminate pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (recognizing married couple's constitutional right to use contraception).
99. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982) (child
rearing expenses too speculative to be awarded). For a discussion of the view
that child rearing costs are speculative in nature, see supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text.
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be reasonably determined using actuarial tables.10 0 Additionally, courts
recognize that juries are competent to make complex damage assess-
ments in other types of negligence cases, such as actions for loss of con-
sortium.' 0 ' Therefore, even if child rearing expenses are not easily
calculated, that is not a fair or reasonable basis on which to deprive full
recovery to a plaintiff in a wrongful pregnancy action.
A second reason given by courts adhering to the limitation of dam-
ages rule for denying recovery of child rearing costs is that such awards
tend to be very large and are out of proportion to the culpability of the
defendant.' 0 2 The potential size of the award in a wrongful pregnancy
action is not a reasonable basis on which to immunize a physician from
the foreseeable results of his negligence. 10 The fact that child rearing
costs are so significant emphasizes the great economic impact that the
defendant's negligence has had upon the plaintiffs' lives-in many cases,
the precise impact that the plaintiffs tried to avoid. Since these costs are
the foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence, and especially be-
cause they are so significant, in the interest of fairness, the defendant
should compensate the plaintiffs for this injury.
Courts that limit damages in a wrongful pregnancy action on the
basis that, as a matter of law, the benefits of raising a normal, healthy
child outweigh the costs rely on moral and ethical judgments rather than
concrete legal principles. 10 4 Plaintiffs who bring wrongful pregnancy
actions, many of whom underwent sterilizations for economic or finan-
cial reasons, do not reach the same conclusion. Such plaintiffs had al-
ready decided before they underwent a sterilization procedure that, for
them, the costs of raising a child outweighed the benefits.' 0 5
Another widely held view among advocates of the limited damages
approach is that awarding child rearing costs to the parents will harm
100. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (1984).
Child rearing expenses can be calculated based on economic factors that are
made regularly by actuaries for insurance companies and estate planners. Id.
101. Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 59, 540 N.E.2d 1370,
1379 (1989) (Brown, J., dissenting) (juries frequently calculate far more specu-
lative damages, such as for pain and suffering, loss of consortium and loss of
earning potential, in personal injury and wrongful death cases). For a discussion
of the ability of juries reasonably to calculate child rearing costs, see supra notes
43, 57 & 84 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982). For a
discussion of the substantial size of awards including child rearing costs, see
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
103. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 66-67, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246
(1990).
104. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("[I]t is a matter of universally-shared emotion and senti-
ment that the intangible but all-important, incalculable but invaluable 'benefits'
of parenthood far outweigh any of the mere monetary burdens involved."). For
a discussion of the view that the benefits of child rearing outweigh the burdens,
see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
105. Burke, 406 Mass. at 769, 551 N.E.2d at 4.
19911 NOTE 823
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the emotional health of the unplanned child. 10 6 One court has gone so
far as to refer to the subject child in a wrongful pregnancy action as an
"emotional bastard." 10 7 This rationale for limiting damages is faulty for
a number of reasons. First, the fact that the unplanned child's parents
seek child rearing costs as damages should not send the child a signal
that the parents do not love and want to keep the child. 108 The plaintiffs
in a wrongful pregnancy action have committed themselves to the wel-
fare of their unplanned child and simply need monetary assistance. 10 9
Second, it is not the award of child rearing expenses which may harm
the unplanned child. Any possible damage to the child would arise from
the fact that the parents initiated the lawsuit in the first place. 110 The
decision whether to bring the lawsuit, however, is one for the parents,
and not the courts, to make. Third, any award of damages that contrib-
utes to the plaintiffs' financial stability should add to, rather than detract
106. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385
(1983). For a discussion of the concern about emotional trauma to the unplan-
ned child in a wrongful pregnancy action, see supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
107. Wilber v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ark. 1982).
108. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 67, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246
(1990). The Marciniak court opined that "[t]he parents' suit for recovery of child
rearing costs is in no reasonable sense a signal to the child that the parents
consider the child an unwanted burden. The suit is for costs of raising the child,
not to rid themselves of an unwanted child." Id.; accord Jones v. Malinowski, 299
Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (1984) (plaintiffs do not seek damages because
they do not love and want to keep child, but because defendant's negligence has
forced upon them burdens which they sought to avoid).
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 60, 540
N.E.2d 1370, 1379-80 (1989) (Brown, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Brown noted that the case was
not about whether Ruth Johnson [the plaintiff mother] wants to keep
her child. Johnson does not want to give up her baby girl. Now that
the child is born she will do her best, within her resources, to raise and
love the child. The mother has accepted the inevitable, and loves and
wishes to raise her child. This does.not erase the fact of injury and
resulting damages.
Id.; see also Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 67, 450 N.W.2d at 246. The Marciniak court
recognized that the plaintiffs clearly loved and wanted to keep their child. Id.
The court noted, however, that "the love, affection and emotional support they
are prepared to give do not bring with them the economic means that are also
necessary to feed, clothe, educate, and otherwise raise the child." Id.
110. Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 61, 540 N.E.2d at 1380 (Brown, J., dissent-
ing). In his dissent, Justice Brown rejected the majority's view that awarding
child-rearing costs may result in emotional harm for the subject child, stating:
The majority expresses concern that a child may experience emotional
harm by discovering that the parents did not desire the child's concep-
tion. Such concern is disingenuous. The child may draw the same con-
clusion from the fact that a suit has been filed to recover the expenses
of pregnancy and childbirth. Surely the majority cannot believe that
refusal to recognize child-rearing expenses as damages will result in
[the plaintiff's] child being raised in a more loving, nurturing
environment.
Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
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from, the child's (as well as the entire family's) emotional well-being."I '
If child rearing damages are awarded, the unplanned child then knows
that his or her birth, although unplanned, has not seriously affected the
family's finances.
The limited damages approach has an inherent inconsistency: If
these courts find that the subject child will be harmed by an award of
child rearing costs, how can they rationalize granting an award of the
costs associated with the birth and delivery? Once the child learns that
the defendant paid these minor expenses, it is doubtful that the fact that
the defendant pays other expenses as well will lead to additional emo-
tional trauma."l 2 Any possible harm to the child's emotional health
would result from the child's knowledge of the defendant's contribution
to his or her expenses, not from the particular cost on which the money
was spent.
The concerns expressed by many courts that awarding child rearing
costs will lead to fraudulent claims" 3 or open a field with no just or
sensible stopping point1 4 are not valid reasons to immunize physicians
from liability for the damages caused by their negligence or to deny
111. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 67,450 N.W.2d at 246. ("Relieving the fam-
ily of the economic costs of raising the child may well add to the emotional well-
being of the entire family, including [the unplanned] child, rather than bring
damage to it."). If child rearing costs are awarded, the addition of a new child
would not further deplete limited family resources which must be spread among
the siblings and parents, thus contributing to the financial stability of the family.
See, e.g., Custodio'v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (compensation awarded not for unwanted child, but rather
to replenish family's exchequer so as not to deprive other family members of
their planned share of family income).
112. The limited damages approach is inconsistent in other ways as well.
See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (Cadena, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974). Justice Cadena recognized another
internal inconsistency present in the limited damages approach:
If, indeed, the satisfaction which normal parents derive from raising a
child outweighs, as a matter of law, the considerable expense of raising
a child, it would follow that such joy and satisfaction would outweigh
the relatively insignificant medical costs of the pregnancy and delivery.
... There is no discernible reason for allowing recovery for these rela-
tively minor "damages" and denying recovery for the substantial costs
of raising and educating a child.
Id.; see alsoJohnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 61, 540 N.E.2d at 1380 (Brown, J., dissent-
ing). In his dissent, Justice Brown also recognized the inconsistency between
the court's award of damages for the costs of the pregnancy and its disallowance
of damages for the expenses of raising the unplanned child. Id. at 61, 540
N.E.2d at 1380 (Brown, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brown, "[t]here is
no rational difference between the damages caused by 'the [wrongful] pregnancy
itself' and the child-rearing expenses. The cost of pregnancy can no more be
balanced against 'the value . . . [of] a smile' than can the child-rearing ex-
penses." Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982) (al-
lowing child rearing costs may lead to fraudulent claims).
114. See, e.g, id.
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their victims the compensation they deserve. Thejudicial system in gen-
eral, and juries in particular, are entirely competent to recognize and
handle these problems should they arise.' 15
Lastly, the reliance of many courts on the avoidable consequences
doctrine of section 918 of the Restatement (Second) 116 as a rationale for
limiting recovery of child rearing costs is misplaced." 17 Section 918 re-
quires only that a plaintiff make reasonable attempts at mitigation of his
or her damages. 1 8 The only forms of mitigation that are available in
this situation (abortion and adoption) are unreasonable. The choice of
abortion or adoption is an intensely personal decision and should not be
mandated by a court. 19 Therefore, section 918 should not be applied
in a wrongful pregnancy action to limit recovery of child rearing
expenses.
Like the approaches that disallow a cause of action for wrongful
pregnancy or limit damages to birth-related expenses, the benefit rule is
also analytically flawed.' 20 Under the benefit rule, the trier of fact is
asked to balance the costs of child rearing against any benefits derived
from raising the child.' 2 ' This approach ignores the fact that the plain-
tiffs in a wrongful pregnancy action have already performed this cost-
benefit analysis; they decided to undergo sterilization precisely because
they had determined that, for them, the benefits did not outweigh the
burdens.12 2 Comment f to section 920 of the Restatement (Second), upon
115. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 68, 450 N.W.2d at 247. In Marciniak, the
defendant physician argued that child rearing costs should not be awarded be-
cause it could lead to fraudulent claims or open a field with no sensible or just
stopping point. Id. at 68, 450 N.W.2d at 246. In deciding that these fears were
unfounded, the Wisconsin court noted that, with respect to "other claims
brought by other plaintiffs, we have confidence in our courts and our juries to
distinguish the legitimate from the fraudulent." Id. at 68, 450 N.W.2d at 247.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 918. For a discussion of the use of the
avoidable consequences doctrine in wrongful pregnancy actions, see supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text.
117. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 274, 473 A.2d 429, 438 (1984)
(mitigation not necessary because unreasonable to require abortion or
adoption).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 918. For the text of § 918, see supra note
39.
119. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 69, 450 N.W.2d at 247 ("[D]ecisions con-
cerning abortion or adoption are highly personal matters and involve deeply
held moral or religious convictions.").
120. For a discussion of the benefit rule and its application to a wrongful
pregnancy action, see supra notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text.
121. See Jones, 299 Md. at 270, 473 A.2d at 435 (permitting "trier of fact to
consider awarding damages to parents for child rearing costs to the age of the
child's majority, offset by the benefits derived by the parents from the child's aid,
society and comfort").
122. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 73, 450 N.W.2d at 249. In Marciniak, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted, "[t]he parents made a decision not to have a
child. It was precisely to avoid that 'benefit' that the parents went to the physi-
cian in the first place." Id.
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which the benefit rule is founded, states that a tortfeasor should not be
permitted to force a benefit on the plaintiff against the plaintiff's will.' 23
By reducing the plaintiffs' damages in a wrongful pregnancy action by
the amount of the "benefit" they will derive from their child, these
courts require the exact result that comment f warns against: forcing the
parents to accept a benefit that they had already decided to avoid.' 2 4
Secondly, and more importantly, the benefit rule as derived from
section 920 is misapplied by the courts that utilize it in a wrongful preg-
nancy context. 125 Section 920 applies only where the benefits of the
defendant's negligence affect the same interest to which the plaintiff has
suffered increased costs. 1 26 Comment a to section 920 states that the
"damages allowable for an interference with a particular interest [of the
plaintiff] be diminished by the amount to which the same interest has been
benefitted by the defendant's tortious conduct."' 27 Comment b states
the corollary proposition that "[d]amages resulting from an invasion of
one interest [of the plaintiff] are not diminished by showing another in-
terest has been benefitted."1 28 Wrongful pregnancy actions involve two
entirely separate and distinct interests of plaintiffs: economic costs and
emotional benefits.' 2 9 Those jurisdictions that have adopted the benefit
rule misapply the Restatement section on which the benefit rule rests by
balancing these separate interests.' 3 0
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 920 comment f. The pertinent portion of
comment f is as follows:
The rule stated in this Section is limited by the general principle under-
lying the assessment of damages in tort cases, which is that an injured
person is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the position he
would have occupied had it not been for the plaintiff's tort. This prin-
ciple is intended primarily to restrict the injured person's recovery to
the harm that he actually incurred and not to permit the tortfeasor to force a
benefit on him against his will.
Id. (emphasis added).
124. See Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 73-74, 450 N.W.2d at 249. In refusing to
apply the benefit rule, the Marciniak court stated that
[a]ny "benefits" that were conferred upon [the parents] as a result of
having a new child in their lives were not asked for and were sought to
be avoided. With respect to emotional benefits, potential parents in
this situation are presumably well aware of the emotional benefits that
might accrue to them as the result of a new child in their lives. When
parents make the decision to forego this opportunity for emotional en-
richment, it hardly seems equitable to not only force this benefit upon
them but to tell them that they must pay for it as well by offsetting it
against their proven emotional damages.
Id.
125. Id. at 72-73, 450 N.W.2d at 248-49.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 920. For the text of § 920, see supra note
42.
127. 'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 920 comment a (emphasis added).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 920 comment b.
129. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 66, 450 N.W.2d at 248-49.
130. Id. at 73, 450 N.W.2d at 249. The Wisconsin court stated that
"[piroperly applied in the negligent sterilization context, the 'same interest' rule
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In Burke, the Massachusetts supreme court opted for the benefit rule
approach.' 3 ' The Burke court, however, imposed an additional limita-
tion on recovery: In order to recover child rearing costs, the plaintiff
must have undergone the sterilization for economic or financial rea-
sons.13 2 This limitation is unrealistic; sterilization is a major decision in
one's life and is usually done for more than just one reason. Therefore,
a requirement that plaintiffs prove their sterilization was chosen for eco-
nomic or financial reasons is a very difficult burden to meet. Although
Burke contains a well-written analysis on why the limited damages rule
should not be followed in Massachusetts,13 3 the court does not take its
reasoning far enough. The court should not have adopted the benefit
rule with its artificial balancing approach, but rather it should have al-
lowed recovery of full damages. Burke, however, represents a step in the
right direction.
V. CONCLUSION
Burke may indicate a modern trend. Hopefully, more courts will
move toward allowing child rearing costs as damages in wrongful preg-
nancy actions. Unfortunately, the limited damages rule is still followed
in a large majority of jurisdictions, and courts continue to rely on it in
dealing with this issue.' 34 Many of the holdings favoring the limited
damages approach, however, are not unanimous decisions, and a
number of those decisions have vigorous dissents that advocate the re-
covery of at least some child rearing expenses.' 3 5 Those dissenting
opinions provide hope that, in the future, the limited damages approach
would require that the economic damages involved in raising the child be offset
by corresponding economic benefits, and that emotional harms be offset by
emotional benefits, and so on." Id.
131. Burke, 406 Mass. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6. For a discussion of the Burke
court's adoption of the benefit rule, see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying
text.
132. Burke, 406 Mass. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6.
133. Id. at 766-71, 551 N.E.2d at 3-5. For a discussion of Burke's rationale
for rejecting the limited damages approach, see supra notes 70-86 and accompa-
nying text.
134. See Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 540 N.E.2d 1370
(1989).
135. See, e.g., Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1081 (D.C.
1984) (Ferren, J., dissenting) (plaintiffs may recover child rearing costs if they
underwent sterilization for economic reasons); Public Health Trust v. Brown,
388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Pearson, J., dissenting) (plain-
tiffs should be awarded child rearing expenses offset by benefit of child's love,
affection and companionship);Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 540 N.E.2d at 1378
(Brown, J., dissenting) (court should follow traditional principles of tort law and
allow plaintiff to recover all child rearing expenses); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124, 128-30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (CadenaJ., dissenting) (parents may
recover all foreseeable costs, including child rearing costs, that result from neg-
ligent sterilization).
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may be scrutinized and rejected, leading to more Burke and Marciniak-
type rulings.
The 1980s and 90s have seen an increase in the adoption of the
benefit rule, although this approach is still the minority view. 13 6 Juris-
dictions that recognize that at least some of the costs of child rearing
should be recoverable are showing a more rational approach to the dam-
ages issue than those courts that adhere to the limited damages rule.
Courts that adopt the benefit rule refuse to apply the moral and ethical
convictions that the majority of courts inject into the traditional tort law
in wrongful pregnancy actions,1 37 but they have further to go. Courts
must abandon artificial methods of limiting damages and must instead
award plaintiffs full compensation without misapplying the "benefit
rule" by attempting to mold it to conform to wrongful pregnancy ac-
tions. Until these courts resolve the inconsistencies in their rulings and
recognize the problem of forcing benefits on plaintiffs in these actions,
the victims of negligent sterilizations will not receive the full compensa-
tion due to them under the law.
Unfortunately, the approach allowing full recovery still remains in
the distinct minority. Presently, only the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
in Marciniak v. Lundborg, has granted full recovery.' 3 8 This decision is a
recent one, and will hopefully set the tone for the rest of the country.
The full recovery approach must be recognized in order to best pro-
tect society from the negligence of its physicians. Limiting or eradicat-
ing liability in negligent sterilization actions simply immunizes
136. See, e.g., Burke, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990) (adopting benefit
rule in wrongful pregnancy actions);Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d
429 (1984) (same); University of Ariz. Health Sciences v. Superior Court, 136
Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (same).
137. See Burke, 406 Mass. at 770, 551 N.E.2d at 4. The Burke court "firmly
reject[ed] a universal rule that the birth of an unexpected healthy child is always
a net benefit." Id. In doing so, the court refused to force its moral judgements
about the birth of a healthy child on society as a whole. Id. at 770, 551 N.E.2d at
5.
138. Id.; cf. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). In
Bowman, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether public policy
prohibits an award of damages for a child born after an unsuccessful sterilization
procedure. Id. at 45, 356 N.E.2d at 499. In a per curiam opinion, the court held
that there was a cause of action for a negligent sterilization, but declined to de-
cide whether the damages in such an action should be limited to the costs of
pregnancy. Id. at 44-46, 356 N.E.2d at 498-99. Many state courts inferred that
the Ohio court's refusal to rule on this issue meant that the court adopted a full
recovery approach. See, e.g., Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 1984);
McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 687 P.2d 850, 853 (1984). Sub-
sequently, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized this problem and explained that
the Bowman court had never addressed the issue of child rearing costs (or any
damages, for that matter) and that the issue of whether child rearing costs are
recoverable in a wrongful pregnancy action was one of first impression in the
case at hand. Johnson v. University Hosps., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 540 N.E.2d 1370
(1989). The Ohio Supreme Court then held that public policy dictated adher-
ence to the limited damages approach. Id. at 58-59, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
NOTE 8291991]
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physicians from their negligent acts and discourages conformity to a
high standard of care when performing these procedures. The refusal
to permit full recovery of damages in wrongful pregnancy actions is
likely to lead to more negligent sterilizations. Ultimately, we must pro-
tect individuals and society from the potential harm that results from
such negligence. We must also ensure that the traditional tort principles
of damages continue to be applied. To create instances where some
causes of action are not bound by ordinary principles of law is to create
uncertainty within our system of compensation for injury.
Jill E. Garfinkle
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